We examine the relationship between institutions, culture and cyclical fluctuations for a sample of 45 European, Middle Eastern and North African countries. Better governance is associated with shorter and less severe contractions and milder expansions. Certain cultural traits, such as lack of acceptance of power distance and individualism, are also linked business cycle features. Business cycle synchronization is tightly related to similarities in the institutional environment. Mediterranean countries conform to these general tendencies.
We can all conjure up images of a Mediterranean jeweled with islands, its coastlines indented by harbors, those schools for mariners, an invitation to travel and trade. In fact, the sea did not always in the past provide that 'natural link' between countries and peoples so often described. ...
As a result, the Mediterranean world was long divided into autonomous areas, only precariously linked. ... These differences have often only been partly created by geography. ... It is the historical past, persistently creating differences and particularities, that has accentuated these peculiarities ... 
Introduction
Understanding the nature of economic fluctuations and their regional interconnections has been gaining importance as the process of globalization continues unabated. By now, a number of papers have documented differences and similarities in the cyclical fluctuations of different regions of the world (see e.g. Rand and Tarp, 2002; Girardin, 2005; Aguiar and Gopinath 2007; Kose and Prasad, 2010; Benczur and Ratfai 2010; Garcia Cicco et. al. 2010; Male, 2011; Altug and Bildirici, 2012) . Recent European Union economic and political initiatives toward Mediterranean countries, in particular, the Union for Mediterranean partnership (see www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed) are generating interest in the structure of cyclical fluctuations of the region and in the channels of transmission of cyclical shocks. establish the existence of four regional factors in the cyclical fluctuations of the Mediterranean basin, roughly covering the major European countries, the Eastern, the Middle Eastern and the Southern Mediterranean countries. These factors display disparate cyclical dynamics and fail to display the increased cross-region linkages that characterize other areas of the world. Canova and Schlaepfer (2011) document the presence of important time variations in the cyclical fluctuations of the region but they cannot relate them with increased trade or financial interdependences.
One key issue the recent literature is trying to understand is the impact of alternative institutional arrangements on business cycle characteristics. The idea that institutions, defined as formal rules and informal constraints, affect the economic performance finds an eloquent enunciation in North (1990) .
Subsequently Knack and Keefer (1995) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Rodrik, et al. (2002) , and Easterly and Levine (2003) , showed that property rights and the rule of law are positively related to economic performance. The impact of monetary and fiscal institutions and of monetary arrangements on longer terms outcomes have also been widely discussed in the literature (see, for example, Grilli et al., 1991; Alesina and Summers, 1993; or Cukierman et al., 1992 , Rose and Engel, 2002 , Allen and Gale 2007 . The recent Euro area debt crisis, however, has drawn attention to the relationship between institutions and business cycles. examined whether the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of the ECB, or the Euro changeover affected European business cycles, but found that the process of cyclical convergence precede these institutional changes and may well be consistent with a greater conformity of the shocks affecting the economies. Noting the durable nature of institutions, associate average measures of business cycle characteristics and business cycle synchronization with a general set of institutional indicators for a large set of countries, and find that the relationship between the two is strong.
Another issue of interest in the literature is the relationship between cultural traits and economic performance. Weber (1904) was the first to point out that the two may be connected. More recently Hofstede (1980) , Granato et al. (1996) and Tabellini (2011) , among others, document that certain cultural factors affect on economic development, over and above those due to macroeconomic or institutional factors. However, whether cultural features are related to the structure and the transmission of business cycles is, to the best of our knowledge, still a completely unexplored area. This paper examines the role of institutions and culture for cyclical fluctuations of a set of developed, developing and emerging market economies. We initially perform the analysis for a sample which includes up to 45 European, Middle Eastern and North African countries and then zoom in on the Mediterranean region. Our interest in institutional and cultural factors as potential determinants of business cycles fluctuations departs from much of the recent literature, which has typically focused on trade and financial integration (see, for example, Imbs, 2010) . However, for many of the new members states of the EU as well as non-EU countries in the Mediterranean, the institutional and cultural environment forms the backdrop in which alternative policies are implemented. In addition, at least in the Mediterranean, differences in trade and financial interdependences do not relate well with differences in cyclical features (see Canova and Schlaepfer, 2011) .
We begin by documenting the business cycle characteristics of different groups of countries in our sample -the EU-15 countries comprising the original members of the EU, the EU-12 comprising the new Eastern European members, non-EU countries, the Mediterranean countries and non-EU Mediterranean countries -using data on real GDP and, in its absence, on industrial production. While previous studies have highlighted the presence of significant heterogeneity even within these groups (see, for example, Altug and Bildirici, 2012) , we start from these broad classifications as they may reflect some common underlying factors or attributes. We then describe the alternative institutional, cultural and macroeconomic indicators used in our study and ask whether business cycle characteristics are associated with institutional and cultural indicators using three alternative methodologies (rank correlation analysis, clustering techniques and regression methods).
The results we obtain are quite robust. Better governance and better civil liberties are associated with shorter and less severe contractions, and milder expansions, while similarities in cultural traits, such as lack of acceptance of power distance and the presence of individualism in a society, are associated with similar business cycle features. Furthermore, business cycle synchronization is strongly related to similarities in the institutional environment. These conclusions seems to be true, in particular, for the Mediterranean region and hold even conditioning on a set of important macroeconomic indicators. The finding that the institutional and cultural environment relates to the persistence and the volatility of business fluctuations and to their synchronization across countries and regions is novel and may help to shift the investigation focus of the existing business cycle literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the techniques used to extract business cycle features and discusses our findings. Section 3 describes the institutional and cultural measures and their properties. Section 4 present the results. Section 5 concludes.
Measuring Business Cycles
To extract the features of cyclical fluctuations in different countries, we compute turning points for "classical" cycles and measure cyclical characteristics using the resulting turning point classification.
It is well known that classical cycles do not control for trends, as they are computed using the level of the series. Nevertheless, the turning point dates the methodology delivers in countries like the US or the EU reproduce quite well NBER and CEPR classifications, which are obtained using judgmental calls. To date peaks and troughs, we use the quarterly version of the Bry-Boschan algorithm recently suggested by Pagan (2005, 2006) . In this algorithm, a business cycle peak is identified if {y t−1 − y t−2 > 0, y t − y t−1 > 0, y t+1 − y t < 0, y t+2 − y t+1 < 0} where y t = ln(Y t ) and Y t is the series of interest, measured at the quarterly interval. Likewise, a trough is identified at time t if {y t−1 − y t−2 < 0, y t − y t−1 < 0, y t+1 − y t > 0, y t+2 − y t+1 > 0}. A complete cycle is defined as alternating peaks and troughs with a minimum duration of five quarters.
To date turning points we use real GDP or, in its absence, industrial production. We chose a single indicator, rather than multiple indicators such as real output, unemployment, industrial production, real income and real sales because, as Altug, et al. (2011) have shown, measures of real output and unemployment are cyclically "de-coupled" in many emerging or developing economies and, at least over the last decade, tend to display different dynamics in many advanced economies as well. In addition, for many of the less developed countries, alternative measures of national wealth (such as real income or sales) are unavailable. Thus, while more reliable business cycle signals can obtained using multiple indicators, lack of data and strong asynchronicity of important variables, lead us to choose a single indicator to date turning points. s=1 ∆ s y t+s . The pairwise concordance index measures the fraction of times two countries are jointly in phase over the business cycle (see Harding and Pagan, 2006) and it is calculated as follows. Let the random variable S it be defined as
0 if country i is in a recessionary phase 1 otherwise.
(2.1) Thus, S it captures business cycle phases. Then the index is given by
where T = min(T i , T j ). Clearly, the concordance index has a maximum value of one when S it = S jt and minimum value of zero when S it = (1 − S jt ).
The diffusion index shows the fraction of countries sharing the same phase at any given time and it is computed as (see Chang and Hwang, 2011) :
where w it are the weights assigned to country i, N t denotes the number of countries for which we have business cycles dates at any t, and S it = 1 if country i is in a recession and zero otherwise. For simplicity, we set w it = 1/N it for all t. fluctuations for a subset of the countries we consider (see ). Since we study business cycle features of developed, emerging and developing economies and further separate out the Mediterranean region as a case study, our results complement those of Male (2011) , who considers a large set of emerging and developing economies but only the US, the UK and Japan among the developed economies, and of , who include only a few countries from the eastern or southern Mediterranean basin in their study of business cycles of transition, emerging and developed countries.
The sources of the data, the length of the sample for each country, and details on the variables used to construct cyclical turning points are described in the data appendix. Krolzig and Toro (2005) and Altug and Bildirici (2012) , who show that the "core" EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) have suffered relatively mild recessions as compared to other countries in the region. The duration of expansions is also largest for the original EU-15 countries, with the remaining countries exhibiting expansions that last, on average, 6 to 10 quarters less. By contrast, the amplitude of expansions for the EU-15 countries is the smallest: here the EU-12 and non-EU Mediterranean countries display the greatest percentage real output increases in this phase.
Some business cycle facts
The cumulated output loss/gain measure suggests that the EU-12 and the non-EU Mediterranean countries suffer most during contractions. However, it is the EU-12 and the EU-15 groups that experience greatest output gains during expansions, followed by the non-EU Mediterranean countries. The causes, however, are different: for EU-12 group, it is the large amplitude of expansions that leads to large cumulative output gains; for the EU-15 countries, large output gains obtain because of the long duration of expansions.
The average concordance index within and across groups, reported on the bottom of Table 1 , also has interesting features. First, the concordance is highest for the older members of the EU, followed 1 We were unable to identify a complete business cycle for Bosnia, Egypt, Montenegro, and Syria among the non-EU countries and Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia among the EU countries. by the new EU members. Interestingly, the concordances between the EU-15 and EU-12 countries is also high. Second, the concordance within non-EU countries is low while the concordance between non-EU and EU countries is higher. Similarly, the concordance within the Mediterranean is low and the synchronization between Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean countries is higher. Thus, there are important business cycle heterogeneities within the non-EU and the Mediterranean: countries in these groups have cycles which are more synchronized with countries outside of the group. Third, while Mediterranean EU countries have cycles which are well synchronized with the cycles of other EU countries, non-EU Mediterranean countries have the lowest concordance, both within themselves and with the others.
Business Cycle Statistics
The dispersion measures also indicate that within group heterogeneities are important. Contractions have roughly the same duration and amplitude in the EU, while this is not the case for non-EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, while in the EU-15 business cycle turning points are quite in phase, this is much less the case in the non-EU or the Mediterranean groups. Once again, non-EU Mediterranean group is the most heterogeneous of all. Thus, the Mediterranean appears to be an area where the features of fluctuations are diverse, heterogeneities are large, and different groups of countries display disparate business cycles patterns. Table 2 , which presents the contraction phases of the countries in the Mediterranean group, confirm the large heterogeneities present in the region. Even among EU member states who are also part of the euro zone, significant differences are present. For example, France experiences two major recessions at two crises times: the collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 and the global financial crisis in 2008. Spain displays five complete recessions, one more than France, while Greece and Italy, two of leading actors in the current debt crisis, feature nine and ten recessions, respectively. Interestingly, the majority of the recessions in Greece occur prior to 1993 while in Italy there is an equal number of recessions before and after 1993.
The turning points for Algeria, Cyprus, Lebanon and Tunisia are obtained using industrial production data, which are known to be less persistent than GDP, but this does not seem to cause the algorithm to give excessive "false alarms". Many non-EU Mediterranean countries display up to six complete cycles since the 1990's and the duration of recessions is, occasionally, long -see e.g. Algeria who experiences a four-year recession between 1993Q4-1997Q4. Balkan countries also feature lengthy recessions in the transition process to new economic and political regimes. Small open economies, such Albania 1990Q1-1992Q1 Jordan 1994Q3-1995Q1 Tunisia 1992Q1-1993Q1 1996Q2-1997Q1 1997Q2-1997Q3 2000Q3-2002Q1 2010Q1-2010Q4 2003Q2-2004Q1 2007Q2-2008Q1 Algeria 1992Q1-1992Q4 Lebanon 1992Q1-1993Q3 Turkey 1988Q1-1989Q2 1993Q4-1997Q4 1997Q4-1998Q2 1994Q1-1994Q2 2000Q4-2001Q2 1999Q2-2000Q1 1998Q2-1999Q1 2004Q2-2004Q3 2002Q3 1989Q1-1989Q4 1980Q2-1980Q4 1991Q1-1993Q2 1992Q4-1993Q1 1994Q1-1994Q2 2008Q2-2009Q2 1996Q1-1996Q2 Greece 1973Q4-1974Q3 Portugal 2002Q3-2003Q2 1977Q1-1977Q2 2008Q1-2008Q4 1980Q3-1981Q1 1981Q4-1983Q2 1984Q4-1985Q1 1986Q1-1987Q1 1990Q2-1990Q3 1992Q2-1993Q4 2008Q4-2009Q1 Israel 1982Q2-1982Q3 Serbia 1997Q4-1999Q2 1988Q2-1989Q1 2008Q2-2009Q2 1992Q3-1993Q2 2001Q1-2001Q4 Italy 1964Q2-1964Q4 Spain 1974Q4-1975Q1 1974Q4-1975Q2 1978Q2-1978Q4 1977Q2-1977Q3 1980Q4-1981Q1 1982Q1-1982Q4 1991Q4-1993Q2 1992Q2-1993Q3 2008Q3-2009Q2 1996Q2-1996Q4 2001Q2-2001Q4 2003Q1-2003Q2 2004Q4-2005Q1 2008Q2-2009Q2 In sum, the EU-15 countries exhibit more persistent and less volatile business cycles; their expansions are the longest and output fluctuations are small, both during contractions and expansions.
The remaining groups of countries have more volatile business cycles, and the non-EU Mediterranean thermore, the countries belonging to the EU-12 and the non-EU Mediterranean groups tend to display business cycle episodes with significant contractions followed by large increases in output, suggesting a boom-bust scenario relative to the more stable economies in the EU-15. The concordance of turning points tends to be high among EU countries, while within the Mediterranean or within the non-EU Mediterranean group differences are large.
Institutional, Cultural and Macroeconomic Indicators
In this section we describe the governance, cultural and macroeconomic indicators we use in the analysis.
While the role of institutional and cultural factors has been extensively studied to explain long-run growth trajectories, such factors may also influence the extent countries can insulate against political risk and regional and global shocks. Countries that have weak rule of law or accountability will also fail to propose and implement policies that benefit large segments of the population. Lack of political stability may prevent even the best designed policies from having their intended effects. The cultural environment may determine the types of activities the population undertakes, whether these will be long-term, productive activities, or whether they will be short-term and lacking in innovation.
We measure institutional and cultural attributes using a set of indicators that have been developed on a cross-country basis. As institutional indicators we consider (i) the average of the Worldwide Governance indices provided by the World Bank (Gov) (see Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009) (v) FDI to GDP (f di/Y ); and (vi) the log of real GDP per capita. We also control for the association with the EU (with a EU dummy (EU ) ), the level of development (with a G-7 dummy (G7)), and for the type of monetary regime adopted (inflation targeting, IT , currency boards CB, or currency union regimes, CU ) since a priori these characteristics could matter for how business cycles develop.
Are Business Cycles, Institutions and Culture Related?
We have shown that business cycle dynamics differ across groups of countries and that within groups, for example, in the Mediterranean, national idiosyncrasies are important. We have also argued that standard development, wealth or monetary indicators cannot explain these differences. As shown by Canova and Schlaepfer (2011) , differences within the Mediterranean cannot be accounted for also by trade or financial openness. Thus, a more complex set of factors may be driving business cycle activity and differences between the EU-15 and the Mediterranean region. Could institutions and culture be some of these factors? This section suggests that they might. Notes: C-dur and E-dur stand for duration of contractions and expansions; C-ampl and and E-ampl for amplitude of contractions and expansions. CBI is the index of central bank independence; Gov is the governance index and F H the freedom house index. P di stands for power distance index, Ind for the index of individualism, M as for the index of masculinity and U AI for the uncertainty avoidance index. A * indicates correlations which are significant at the 10 percent level. Figure 3 suggests that the same level of business cycle synchronization is associated with a wide range of macroeconomic performance.
Some preliminary evidence
The fact that differences in macroeconomic variables do not correlate well with the concordance index, while differences in institutional indicators do, is interesting. If the institutional environment affects both the severity of recessions and the cyclical synchronization with other countries, as the recent experience of Greece or Italy in the European debt crisis suggests, then a sole focus on the macroeconomic factors as drivers of business cycles may be much less warranted than previously assumed. The CBI index is uncorrelated with the duration and the amplitude of both recessions and expansions. Thus, as in , monetary institutions do not necessarily affect the persistence and the volatility of business cycles. Countries which have good governance (or a low Freedom House score), on the other hand, tend to have contractions which significantly shorter durations and amplitudes that are significantly smaller, in both contractions and expansions. As we have seen in Table 1 Perhaps, one should not be particularly surprised to find that the persistence and the amplitude of business cycles fluctuations depend on how well run a the country is, and which cultural values are ingrained in the society. What is more striking is the strong association between synchronicity of turning points dates and institutional and cultural characteristics. Both of these facts have been largely overlooked in studies which try to explain business cycles similarities and differences. Thus, institutions and norms, more than trade or financial interdependencies, could be crucial to understand why cyclical fluctuations are similar or not.
Clustering
An alternative way to examine whether institutions and culture are related to the business cycle characteristics is to cluster business cycles features and ask if the groups that are generated using, To test the difference between groups we use the U-Mann (rank sum) test. This is a non-parametric two-sided test which examines whether the medians of the two samples have the same value. Thus, small or large p-values indicate significant evidence against the null. The results broadly confirm the conclusions of Table 3 . First, institutions seem to matter, both for the whole set of countries and for the restricted Mediterranean group. In particular, the amplitude of contractions and the pairwise concordance significantly differ in the two groups. The duration of expansions differs when the full sample is used, but not significantly so for the restricted set of Mediterranean countries. Thus, having better institutions tends to make contractions shorter, expansions more long-lasting and cyclical phases more synchronized.
The results obtained clustering business cycles using cultural differences are less clear cut. For the Notes: C-dur and E-dur stand for duration of contractions and expansions; C-ampl and and E-ampl for amplitude of contractions and expansions. Groups are endogenously constructed using a cluster algorithm that looks for similarities of cyclical fluctuations. Institutional indicators: (i) with the full sample, group 1 includes Albania, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Morocco, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey, Cyprus and Greece and group 2 the rest; (ii) with the Mediterranean sample, group 1 includes Albania, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Morocco, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Greece and group 2 the rest. Cultural indicators: (i) with the full sample, group 1 includes Albania, Jordan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Morocco, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands and Norway and group 2 the rest; (ii) with the Mediterranean sample, group 1 includes Albania, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Morocco, Serbia and group 2 the rest. Reported is the p-value of a U-Mann test for similarities in the median statistic across the groups. only the concordance index seem to be significantly different. One reason why we fail to detect significant differences across groups when cultural features are used is that the groups that the clustering algorithm creates are not very homogeneous. For example, one group includes Albania, Lebanon but also Luxembourg and Norway. Thus, a larger number of groups is probably needed to capture the heterogeneities present in the data. However, given the small number countries we have in our cross section, cells may end up being empty or with two few units, making the test uninformative.
Regressions
Next, we relate business cycle characteristics with the institutional and cultural indicators via regression analysis. The top part of Table 5 Some of the cultural indicators are also significantly related to the business cycle characteristics. In particular, greater power distance is associated with larger output losses during contractions (because of increased amplitude during contractions) while greater individualism implies smaller output losses in such phases (because of decreased amplitude during contractions). In addition, the greater is the masculinity in a society the larger is the duration of contractions. Thus, societies in which individuals are more satisfied with their endeavors are also those less recession prone.
One may argue that institutional and cultural features may not be exogenous to business cycle features, making the causality of the relationship unclear. After all, the recent European debt crisis indicates that the severity of certain recessions may lead to important institutional changes. To give a causal interpretation to the evidence, we have considered two additional regressions with Gov and F H indicators, which have a time series dimension, as right hand side variables. However, rather than using their average values over the sample, we use pre-sample values in the regressions. In this way, the hypothesis of reverse causality is much harder to entertain. For the F H indicator, data is available Notes: C-dur and E-dur stand for duration of contractions and expansions; C-ampl and and E-ampl for amplitude of contractions and expansions. Gov is the governance index; CBI is the index of central bank independence;F H the Freedom House index. P di stands for power distance index, Ind for the index of individualism, M as for the index of masculinity and U AI for the uncertainty avoidance index. Gov presample and F H sample denotes the pre-sample values of the indicators. P Cinst and P C cult are the first principal component of the institutional and cultural indicators. All the regressions include a constant and the first principal component of the macroeconomic variables. t-statistics in parentheses. Overall, the trust of the conclusions remain even though the significance of coefficients decreases:better governance still mitigate outputs losses during contractions and make expansions longer; worse civil liberties make expansions shorter and less vigorous. (2011)). Thus, it is worth investigating whether institutions and culture explain the heterogeneities and the asymmetries in business cycles that the region displays.
We do not report the estimated coefficients obtained running regressions of the amplitude and the duration of contractions and expansions on institutional and cultural features since the number of degrees of freedom are very small, making asymptotic t-tests a very poor indicators of the significance Regression coefficients obtained associating the concordance index with differences in institutional and cultural features in the Mediterranean are in the second column of Table 6 -here the number of degrees of freedom is large and thus asymptotic approximation better behaved. Once again, small differences in Gov and F H are associated with higher business cycle synchronization. Interestingly, In the earlier sections, we documented significant heterogeneities and lack of synchronization in business cycles for the Mediterranean and non-EU Mediterranean countries. The results we have presented account, at least in part, for these heterogeneities: countries with better governance indicators tend to experience less volatile business cycles, have more persistent expansions and are more synchronized. Furthermore, business cycle synchronization is higher in countries with similar cultural traits.
The evolution of business cycles in the Mediterranean
Given the robust association between governance indicators and business cycles we found, we can obtain some indication of the potential evolution of business cycles for the non-EU Mediterranean countries, by looking at the time profile of their governance indicators. While the institutional characteristics of EU countries have been studied extensively, much less is known about the governance and civil 
Conclusions
This paper examines the association between institutional and cultural indicators, business cycle features and synchronization for a set of developed, emerging, and developing countries. We find that these factors matter over and above those implied by standard macroeconomic indicators and that similarities in institutional characteristics go hand in hand with greater business cycle synchronization.
While in most places we were careful in avoiding causal interpetation of the association, in some instances we are able to strengthen our conclusions and show that improved institutions lead to better cyclical outcomes.
To the best of our knowledge, we are among the firsts to systematically document the relationship between institutions, culture and cyclical characteristics and to stress the important role of these factors have for cyclical fluctuations. Our findings are important, as the literature focuses on macroeconomic features, such as openness to trade, to financial penetration, distance or commonality of shocks, to explain the cross sectional pattern of business cycle characteristics. Such factors need not be crucial to account for the heterogeneities of business cycle features, at least for the countries we analyze, and perhaps more importantly, taking them into account does not reduce the association between business cycles characteristics and the institutional and cultural features we document.
Our results have crucial implications for policy. Getting the macroeconomic house in order is not necessarily a prerequisite for moderating cyclical fluctuations in emerging and developing economies, but improving the institutional and the cultural framework appears to be. Countries where the rules of the game do not work or where societal norms promote rent-seeking instead of productive activities may continue to function as boom-bust economies, prone to large domestic, regional and global shocks.
Development economists have noted that if greater trade and financial liberalization do not go hand in hand with policies that benefit large segments of the population, countries may fail to change their existing growth paths. This seems to be true also for cyclical trajectories: improved institutions could promote more vigorous expansions and less volatile fluctuations. The lack of political stability or the lack of voice and accountability in a society, on the other hand, may prevent the right macroeconomic policies from having their intended effects.
The recent Arab Spring movements have shown that political repression may be associated with economic stagnation and lack of opportunities cannot be sustained, even in societies that share many cultural traits. Our analysis shows that aspects of governance in a society and the civil liberties it enjoys are correlated with business cycle features, and are an important determinant of how synchronized cyclical fluctuations are across countries. While, as economists, are still far from understanding how such institutional features translate into actual policy choices, we can nevertheless offer, based on out results, a simple suggestion: macroeconomic advice given in the absence of the right institutional and governance environment is likely to fall on deaf ears. Our study offers some intriguing findings in this regard, and suggests that improved macroeconomic policies should be implemented together with measures that strengthen civil and political institutions and improve governance in the society. Table A .1 lists the countries used in our study together with the data sources and sample periods.
When GDP is not available, we used data on the industrial production index. GDP is measured at constant prices, in units of the national currency, and it is available for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the US, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and Morocco in de-seasonalized form. The remainder of the data were de-seasonalized using the X11 linear de-seasonalization method.
Data on the institutional indicators are derived from the following sources and measure the following aggregates:
• • Indices of central bank independence (CBI) provided by Cukierman et al. (1992 Cukierman et al. ( , 2002 and extended by Arnone et al. (2007) . This is a legal index that aggregates 16 characteristics of central bank (CB) charters, including variables measuring the allocation of authority over monetary authority, procedures for resolution of conflicts between the CB and the government, the relative importance of price stability in the charter of the CB, the nature of limitations on lending by the CB to the government, and procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the governor of the CB.
Data on the cultural indicators are obtained from the study of organizational motivation across countries run by Geert Hofstede (http://geert-hofstede.com), who considers five separate dimensions -"power distance", "individualism", "masculinity/femininity", and "uncertainty avoidance".
